An important aim of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was to reduce cost of capital by enhancing auditor independence. However, prior literature has argued that SOX has been ineffective in meeting this objective. We contribute to this debate by first providing evidence suggesting that auditor independence has increased following SOX. Though we posit an inverse relationship between auditor independence and cost of capital, it is an open question whether this relationship has become stronger or weaker following SOX. An examination of this relationship reveals that auditor independence is more strongly related to bond rating and bond yield premium in the post-SOX period relative to the period before SOX. This evidence supports the argument that SOX has created benefits that resulted in lower cost of borrowing.
Introduction
Better quality of financial information attracts higher valuations because investors can measure future cash flows with greater degree of certainty. This implies that the cost of capital is inversely related to the degree of reliability in reported financial figures (Dye, 2001; Verrecchia, 2001; Easley and O'Hara, 2004; Gietzmann and Ireland, 2005; Nikolaev and Van Lent, 2005) .
Because auditors can influence managers' reporting practices, the literature also suggests that auditor independence and reliability of financial reporting are positively related (Kinney et al., 2004) . Independent auditors can also provide effective monitoring to deter fraud and wasteful actions at the expense of lenders and shareholders (DeAngelo, 1981) . As a result, firms audited by more independent auditors are expected to benefit from lower cost capital. The scant research on the association between auditor independence and the cost of capital confirms this hypothesis (Khurana and Raman, 2006; Brandon et al., 2004; Dhaliwal et al., 2009) The accounting scandals in the early 2000s prompted U.S. legislators to pass the SarbanesOxley Act (SOX) of 2002. Among other objectives, the aim of the act was to enhance auditor independence as a means to reducing cost of capital. The SEC (2003) has maintained that potential benefits include increased investor confidence in the independence of accountants, in the audit process, and in the reliability of reported financial information, which would result in a lower cost of capital.
1 But little is empirically known if SOX has been successful in meeting this objective. To shed light on this question, we examine if the inverse relationship between auditor independence and cost of capital has become stronger or weaker following SOX. Evidence that auditor independence is higher coupled with stronger inverse relationship between cost of capital and auditor independence would support the argument that SOX has been successful in meeting its stated objective, namely, a unit of auditor independence is priced in capital markets more after SOX than before.
We develop a model in which an auditor optimally decides on the level of independence.
This decision is influenced by the level of fees she can charge for reducing her independence against litigation and reputation costs, that arise when quality of reported numbers is poorer or monitoring and fraud detection are less effective. Investors in turn price the client's securities taking into account the quality of information and the strength of monitoring by auditors.
Consistent with prior literature, better disclosure and monitoring lead to higher valuation because they involve higher cash flows and less information asymmetry. In this model, cost of capital is therefore inversely related to auditor independence. The various requirements of SOX (see below) affect the level of independence chosen by the auditor by changing the cost-benefit analysis she faces. This, in turn, may enhance or weaken the positive relationships between independence on one hand and monitoring and quality of disclosure on the other hand, depending on the assumed functional relationships. As a result, the magnitude of the negative relationship between auditor independence and cost of capital may be stronger or weaker following SOX. Hence, this is ultimately an empirical issue. However, we show that under certain conditions an increase in auditor independence following SOX is expected to increase the magnitude of this relationship.
There are a number of reasons why SOX is expected to enhance auditor independence.
First, SOX may have forced firms and external auditors to implement mechanisms that are capable of reducing misreporting. Second, by barring auditors from providing certain non-audit services (NAS), SOX may have forced auditors to direct more effort to the audit task and to better monitoring of potentially fraudulent activities. Prior to this change, audit services may have been provided at a loss, reducing their effectiveness. Furthermore, the establishment of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), a quasi-governmental agency, has fundamentally changed the regulation of the audit profession, which previously was selfregulated (DeFond and Francis, 2005) . As a result, auditors face tougher scrutiny and tighter enforcement following SOX. Third, SOX makes it unlawful to exert improper influence on external auditors. Collectively, these requirements imply that the costs associated with weak independence should increase following SOX, suggesting that, ceteris paribus, the level of auditor independence should increase after SOX. However, a number of commentators have argued that it is unclear whether SOX has been effective in changing auditors' incentives and the way they operate (e.g., Ribstein, 2002; DeFond and Francis, 2005) .
We use the primary bond market in our empirical assessment of the effect of SOX on the cost of capital. We use bond ratings and yield premium as measures of cost of debt capital. We use the bond market because the pricing of debt is better defined and easily measured than that of equity (Mansi et al., 2004) . This allows sharper inferences because there is no need to rely on inherently noisy models for estimating the cost of equity capital. Also, accounting research tends to focus on valuation effects on equity, however, as debt markets are larger than equity markets, it is important to consider the effects of auditor independence on the pricing of debt.
Our sample contains public firms that actively and often repeatedly issue debt and for which any changes in ratings and the cost of debt are expected to have material impact on cash flows. Since secondary markets are less liquid, using the primary bond market avoids measurement issues due to stale prices or ratings. Furthermore, within this sample we also identify a subset of companies that issued bonds both before and after SOX. As such, reported findings are less sensitive to variation in firm-specific effects.
An economic dependence between external auditors and their clients may arise when an auditor relies on fees for non-audit services (NAS) or when an individual client generates an unusually high proportion of the auditor's total fee income. By offering a more profitable line of business, auditors may sacrifice independence in the audit task and risk litigation in order to maintain the more lucrative engagements (Levitt, 2000; Pany and Reckers, 1983; DeFond et al., 2002) . Thus, consistent with prior studies, our first measure of auditor independence is based on the ratio of audit fees to total (i.e., audit fees plus non-audit) fees. The second measure is the log of total fees paid to the auditor, which unlike the first measure, is sensitive to scaling effects and may provide a better reflection of the importance of a client to the auditor's business DeFond and Francis, 2005) . We regress these two measures on firm-specific, auditor-specific and task-complexity factors, consistent with models used by Kinney and Libby (2002), Frankel et al., (2002) , and Ruddock et al., (2006) . Then, we estimate auditor independence as the unexpected ratio of audit fees to total fees and the unexpected component of total fees, respectively.
We first document evidence consistent with a positive effect of SOX on auditor independence. We then find stronger positive association between auditor independence and bond ratings for bonds issued in the post-SOX period than for bonds issued before SOX was enacted. We also find stronger negative association between auditor independence and yield spreads in the post-SOX period. These findings are robust to additional sensitivity analyses, such as controlling for multiple issues by the same firms and examining a sample of firms that issue debt both in the pre-and post-SOX periods. Collectively, these findings support the view that SOX enhanced auditor independence and, as a result, lowered cost of debt capital. The finding that auditor independence is more strongly related to cost of debt capital after SOX than before is consistent with auditor independence becoming more credible for monitoring and reporting purposes after SOX.
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the background necessary to establish the main research question. Section 3 discusses the research design while the sample and data are described in Section 4. The results of the empirical analyses are reported in Section 5. Section 6 provides concluding remarks.
Literature Review and Development of Hypotheses
Auditor independence affects cost of capital in two ways. First, greater independence leads to better monitoring of the firm's net assets by the external auditors and higher rates of fraud discovery (DeAngelo, 1981) . Better monitoring by auditors allows investors to forgo their own costly monitoring activities aimed at reducing the risk of expropriation on part of managers.
This reduces the cost of capital and increases the price investors are willing to pay for the firm's securities. Consistent with this argument, Ashbaugh and Warfiled (2003) document a positive association between the selection of auditors with better monitoring skills and corporate debt levels in Germany. Second, independent auditors increase the credibility of reported figures and hence reduce the information asymmetry between investors and managers, which in turn reduces investment risk and cost of capital. Consistent with this argument, Pitman and Fortin (2004) find that large auditors provide better monitoring, which restricts earnings management and increases earnings quality. Botosan (1997) for lower independence, with likely litigation cost and loss of reputation (Palmrose, 1988) . It is assumed that greater independence improves reporting quality, monitoring and fraud detection.
Consequently, the resulting relationship between auditor independence and cost of capital is negative; however, the magnitude of this relationship varies with the level of independence (i.e., non-linear relationship). We show that SOX may increase or decrease this magnitude, depending on certain parameter values. We define certain conditions under which this magnitude increases with auditor independence. Specifically, this will be the case if the precision of financial reporting is sufficiently sensitive to changes in auditor independence. If SOX resulted in an increase in the optimal level of auditor independence, we expect a stronger negative relationship between cost of capital and auditor independence after SOX.
We later provide evidence consistent with SOX increasing auditor independence. In addition, Cohen et al. (2008) provide evidence that reporting quality increased after SOX (as measured by a decline in earnings management). Taken together, these empirical findings suggest a calibration of our model under which financial reporting is quite sensitive to changes in auditor independence and, hence, a stronger negative association between auditor independence and cost of debt capital following SOX. However, as we discuss below, these latter observations aside, the literature on SOX is yet undecided on its likely effects.
SOX was enacted in order to fix auditing, particularly auditor independence, in the U.S. (Coates, 2007) . To enhance auditor independence SOX requires a variety of mechanisms that directly aim at enhancing external monitoring activities through improving internal control procedures and placing more responsibility on the internal audit committee. The Act has also introduced greater costs for audit failures through the establishment of the PCAOB, whose role is "to protect investors and the public interest by promoting informative, fair, and independent audit reports". 2 In addition, new regulations bar certain non-audit services (NAS) and require fee disclosures. The regulators' presumption is that the removal of NAS, the disclosure requirements and the overall strengthening of the external auditor's position should result in greater auditor independence.
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Still, some argue (e.g., Ribstein, 2002; DeFond and Francis, 2005) that SOX is too costly and potentially ineffective. It is also possible that fees lost because of restrictions on NAS were recovered by charging higher audit fees, as auditors passed on to clients any cost they have incurred after SOX. Moreover, Coates (2007) argues that SOX made relatively small changes to already existing rules governing NAS. In addition, it has been argued that SOX may have resulted in a better alignment of shareholders' interests with that of managers, which can come at the expense of lenders (DeFond et al., 2007) . The benefit of improved independence, if any, may thus accrue to shareholders and lenders will not be able to reduce cost of capital.
Given these conflicting arguments, we therefore ask: Has the passage of SOX enhanced auditor independence and has it affected the association between auditor independence and the cost of debt capital? To the extent that SOX has enhanced auditor independence, this should lead to more effective monitoring activities and the supply of higher quality information. If lenders have benefitted from better auditor independence, we would expect to see stronger relationship between auditor independence and cost of capital following SOX.
Research Design
The The second measure is based on the unexpected element in log of total fees (UNEXPLTFEE) for similar reasons. Log of total fees (LTFEE), in contrast to RAUD, is sensitive to scaling effects, and may provide a better reflection of the importance of a client to the auditor's business Francis, 2006) . Note that higher UNEXPLTFEE signifies less independence.
To measure the unexpected components of RAUD and LTFEE, we use a model similar to the one in Frankel et al. (2002) and Ruddock et al. (2006) . Specifically, fees paid to the auditor are a function of a number of firm-specific factors (e.g., financial performance, leverage, market-to-book and growth), auditor-specific factors (e.g., Big-4 indicator, tenure and whether the auditor has been recently replaced), as well as task-complexity factors (e.g., size, and number of business segments). We also include a proxy for litigation risk, which may affect fees. Specifically, the full model, estimated on an annual basis is: to a different audit firm in the fiscal year prior to the bond issuance, and "0" otherwise. It is included because firms may engage in opinion shopping which may lead to an effect on fees paid to the new auditor (Lennox, 2000) . Finally, LIT i is a proxy for litigation risk, measured as the standard deviation of monthly stock return for the past 36 months (Francis et al., 1994) .
We estimate Equation (1) for each year with industry fixed effects according to Fama and French's 12-industry classification. Then, we compute the unexpected components of RAUD and LTFEE as the regression residual. Positive (negative) UNEXPRAUD indicates greater (lower)
independence. To simplify the reading of our results, we reverse the sign of residual form the LTFEE regression, so as to obtain a similar ordering whereby a positive residual indicates high level of independence while a negative residual signifies low level of independence.
Consistent with Ziebart and Reiter (1992) and Shi (2003) , we use bond rating assigned by credit rating agencies and bond yield spread to capture the cost of borrowing. We construct one equation where bond rating (RATING) is the dependent variable and a second equation where bond yield spread (SPREAD) is the dependent variable. Though we are particularly interested in the association between auditor independence, the main variable of interest, and bond ratings and yield spread, we control for a number of factors that prior studies (e.g., Ziebart and Reiter, 1992; and Mansi et al., 2004) have identified to be associated with the cost of borrowing.
Specifically, the basic bond rating equations contain the following components:
Bond ratings are coded as integers ranging from 1 (Aaa) to 22 (D) based on Moody's categorical bond rating (higher integer value implies worse rating). Yield spread is defined as the difference in percentage points between the yield to maturity for the corporate debt and the yield on a United States treasury bond with comparable maturity on the issuance date. Higher spread thus implies higher cost of debt capital. That is, yield spread is unaffected by the level of the risk-free rate.
The coefficient β 1 on INDEP it captures the effect of auditor independence on bond ratings and yield spread. Consistent with the theoretical model, greater independence leads to lower cost of capital, implying that the coefficients β 1 in equations (2a) and (2b) are expected to be negative. We use the following control variables in our regression models: ISIZE i denotes the relative size of the debt issue, measured as the total principal amount of debt issue divided by the firm's total assets. Large debt issue means higher probability of default and therefore is expected to be positively related to the cost of borrowing (Sengupta, 1998) . SIZE i is firm size, as defined before. Ceteris paribus, larger firms are more diversified and less risky, hence are expected to have better bond ratings and lower bond yield premium. LEV i is a leverage ratio as defined above. Higher leverage ratios are associated with lower ratings (higher assigned integers) and higher bond yield premium, because leverage is associated with financial risk.
OSCORE i is a measure of bankruptcy risk, measured as Ohlson's (1980) score. This score captures likelihood of bankruptcy that may not be captured by other variables and is expected to be negatively related to bond rating and the cost of borrowing. COVR i is the firm's interest coverage ratio, measured as operating income divided by interest expenses. This variable captures the ability of the borrowing firm to make regular interest payment. We thus expect higher coverage ratio to be positively (negatively) related to ratings (bond yield premium). ROA i is operating profitability, as defined above. Consistent with Shi (2003), we expect higher profitability to be positively (negatively) related to ratings (bond yield spread). Finally, LIT i is a measure of litigation risk, as defined before. This risk measure is expected to be associated with lower rating and higher cost of borrowing.
The bond yield spread equation also includes bond ratings (RATING) as an explanatory variable. Rating agencies (e.g., Moody's) assess default probabilities, which are used by investors, together with other information (e.g., auditor independence) to price bonds. As investors likely observe the rating agencies' reports and use these as inputs into their own models in addition to their private information, we use RATING as a proxy for investors' own assessment of default probability. Consequently, the other coefficients in Equation (2b) capture any incremental effect on the bond yield spread of investors' beliefs after controlling for the information already reflected in ratings.
The focus of the main tests is whether the coefficients β 1 in equations (2a) and (2b) changed around the enactment of SOX. To facilitate these tests, we define an indicator variable, SOX, which is set equal to "1" during the post-SOX period, and "0" otherwise. To the extent that SOX has increased auditor independence and consequently resulted in reduction in cost of capital, the difference of the coefficient on INDEP is expected to be negative and significant.
Absence such an effect, or to the extent that bondholders are worse off because of the effect of SOX on auditor independence, we would expect a non-negative difference.
Sample and Descriptive Statistics
To estimate Equation (1) observations suitable for estimating Equation (1). In this analysis, we use a larger sample than the sample of bond issuers that will be used for the main analysis. This is because we are interested in measuring auditor independence for the entire population and not only for bond issuers to avoid bias in these measures. This procedure also furnishes more power to capture structural changes following SOX. The estimation of the RAUD regression employs the quasilikelihood method (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996) since the dependent variable ranges between zero and one. The regression results for RAUD are presented in Turning to Panel B, all seven coefficients on ROA are negative, as expected, and significant at the 0.01 level suggesting that profitable firms' total fees to auditors are lower.
Firms with relatively larger inventories and receivables consume relatively more services, as reflected by the positive coefficients on INVREC (significant at the 0.01 level in all years). Also, as expected, larger firms consume more services from audit firms, as reflected by the positive and significant coefficients on SIZE. Firms characterized by high market-to-book ratios pay more to audit firms due to the presence of more intangibles, which may be associated with the demand for special services from the audit firm. Engaging in mergers and acquisition activities and having more business segments require more services from the audit firms, as indicated by the positive coefficients on MA and SEG (generally significant at the 0.05 level or better). 
UNEXPLTFEE.
We also estimated Equation (1) These results suggest that bonds have become more risky following the enactment of SOX.
Panel A also shows that return on assets (ROA), cash from operations (CFO) and market-tobook ratios (MB) decreased subsequent to the enactment of SOX. This reduction in firm profitability is consistent with the increase in bond risk.
Audit fees account for 39% of total fees (mean RAUD = 0.39) in the Pre-SOX period, increasing to 68% (mean RAUD = 0.68) following SOX (difference is significant at the 0. In addition, the independence measures are correlated with RATING and SPREAD, as expected.
( Table 4 about here) implying that greater auditor independence is associated with better bond ratings for both periods examined. The difference between the two coefficients is -0.39 and is statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
Empirical Results
As for the control variables, bond ratings are more sensitive to the interest coverage ratio This last result suggests no direct effect of SOX on bond ratings.
The analysis of the yield spread, reported in the last three columns, reveals no statistically significant association with UNEXPRAUD in the pre-SOX period. In contrast, the coefficient on UNEXPRAUD in the post-SOX is negative and significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level (-0.26, t = -2.23). The difference between the two coefficients is -0.30 and is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. This result suggests that the negative association between the cost of borrowing and auditor independence has become stronger after the enactment of SOX.
Regarding the control variables, all the controls, except ISIZE are statistically significant in both periods. We find that the yield spread is less sensitive to issue size (ISIZE) and more sensitive to issuer size (SIZE) following SOX (both at the 0.05 level). All other control variables do not exhibit different association with yield spread following SOX. In addition, the coefficient on the SOX indicator variable is negative and significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level (-0.32, t = -2.40), suggesting that, on average, yield spread decreased after the enactment of SOX.
Note that this is in contrast to the findings of the univariate analysis reported in Table 3 . This is broadly consistent with some of the Act's provisions having a direct effect of reducing cost of debt capital. The model explanatory power is high, as reflected by R 2 s ranging between 0.62 and 0.74 across the six regressions.
Overall, the results so far are consistent with improvement in auditor independence (Table 3) and that auditor independence, as measured by UNEXPRAUD, is more inversely related to the cost of debt capital in the post-SOX period (Table 5 ). The results also suggest that after controlling for several economic factors, including auditor independence, the average yield spread has declined following SOX. The average reduction in yield spread following SOX should be viewed as a direct economic benefit of the Act.
( Table 5 about here) Table 6 is similar in structure to Table 5 , but utilizes UNEXPLTFEE as the measure of auditor independence. Starting with the bond rating analysis, the coefficient on UNEXPLTFEE in the pre-SOX period is negative and statistically significant at the 0.10 level. In the post-SOX period this coefficient is more negative and the difference between the two coefficients is negative and statistically significant at the 0.05 level (-0.17, t = -2.42). This result confirms that the association between bond ratings and auditor independence has become stronger following
SOX.
Similar to Table 5 , all the control variables are statistically significant at the 0.05 level or better in both periods. Also, bond ratings are more sensitive to the interest coverage ratio When SPREAD is the dependent variable, the results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 5 . In particular, the independence measure is negatively related to the yield spread in both periods and the difference between the two coefficients is negative and statistically significant at the 0.05 level (-0.15, t = -2.20) . This result suggests a stronger negative relationship with cost of debt capital following SOX. Also, the coefficient on the SOX indicator variable is negative and significantly different zero at the 0.05 level (-0.36, t = -2.57),
suggesting that, on average, yield spread decreased after the enactment of SOX.
Overall, the results in Tables 3, 5 and 6 are consistent with SOX improving auditor independence and that following the Act the negative association between auditor independence and cost of debt capital is stronger. This suggests that auditor independence is priced by lenders to a greater extent after SOX than before, consistent with auditor independence becoming more credible for monitoring and reporting purposes after SOX.
( Table 6 about here) We carry out a number of sensitivity tests. First, because the measure of the unexpected component in Equation (1) may be sensitive to the model specification, we use the raw level of RAUD as a third measure of independence. The regression results involving this variable are reported in Table 7 . The bond rating analysis shows that in both sub periods, the coefficient on RAUD is negative and significant at the 0.05 level, or better. The difference is negative, as expected, but not statistically significant at the 0.10 level. The analysis of yield spread shows a negative and significant coefficient on RAUD in both the pre-SOX and the post-SOX periods.
The difference of -0.44 between these coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level suggesting that the association between the cost of borrowing and auditor independence has become stronger following SOX. In addition, the coefficient on the SOX indicator variable is negative (-0.28, t = -2.26) and significant at the 0.05 level suggesting, as in tables 5 and 6, that after controlling for auditor independence and other relevant factors, yield spread decreased following the enactment of SOX.
( Table 7 about here) A potential explanation for these findings is that companies that issued debt in the post-SOX period are fundamentally different from those that issued debt in the pre-SOX period and that these fundamental differences are not adequately captured by our control variables. To remove any fixed firm effects, we repeat the analysis using only companies that issued debt both in the pre-and the post-SOX periods. This way, firm-specific cross-sectional differences among sample firms are controlled for, although it is still possible, but less likely, that fundamental differences exist in the same set of firms in two different sub-periods. Tables 5, 6 and 7, respectively.
When UNEXPRAUD is the auditor independence measure, the difference in the coefficients between the pre-and post-SOX periods is negative, as expected, and statistically significant at the 0.01 level for both the bond rating and the yield spread regressions. When UNEXPLTFEE and RAUD serve as the independence measures, the coefficient on the independence variable is more negative in the post-SOX period than in the pre-SOX period. The differences between the pre-and post-SOX coefficients are negative, as expected, in all cases.
However, these differences are significant at the 0.05 level or better in the yield spread regressions but not in the bond rating regressions. Regarding the coefficients on the SOX indicator variable, these are negative and significant at the 0.05 level in the yield spread regressions. Overall, results in Table 8 are consistent with those reported in Tables 5-7 suggesting that firm fixed-effects are not driving our results.
( Table 8 about here) We conducted several additional robustness checks. Since SPREAD, is a bounded dependent variable, we re-estimate the yield spread regressions in Tables 5-7 using lognormal transformation of the dependent variable to check the sensitivity of our findings to the normality assumption. Specifically, we compute the natural logarithm of one plus SPREAD and use it as the dependent variable in Equation (2). We find that the coefficients on UNEXPRAUD, UNEXPLTFEE and RAUD are more negative and statistically significant in the post-SOX period than in the pre-SOX period and that the difference is statistically significant at the 0.10 level or better in all three cases. Thus, the fact that SPREAD is a bounded dependent variable does not affect our inferences.
Second, we also check the robustness of the main findings to the choice of mid 2002 as a cutoff point for the pre-and post-SOX periods. The implementation of the SOX Act has not been instantaneous as Congress left for the SEC to set the precise rules for certain sections of the Act.
Thus, the full effect of SOX has been felt perhaps months after July 2002. On the other hand, consistent with our original cutoff point, it is plausible that companies have started to react to the new law even before the specific rules and the effective day were set for the various sections of the Act. We therefore replicate the analyses in Tales 5-7 by selecting 30 July 2003 as an alternative cutoff point. Bond issuances that took place after this date are classified as post-SOX.
The results (not tabulated) are very similar to those reported in Tables 5-7 and all the statistical inferences hold as before.
Third, the inclusion of multiple issues by the same firm raises a concern regarding the over-estimation of the previous models. To address this concern, we estimate our equations using a reduced sample. In particular, if a firm issues multiple bonds in the same fiscal year, then only the first issue is used in the sample. This sampling process results in a reduced sample of 209 pre-SOX and 493 post-SOX firm/year observations. The results based on the reduced sample (not tabulated) are very similar to those reported in Tables 5-7 . In particular, the difference in the coefficients on the independence measures UNEXPRAUD and UNEXPLTFEE are negative and statistically significant at the 0.10 level or better in both the bond rating and yield spread regressions. However, the difference in RAUD is statistically significant only in the yield spread regression.
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Our analysis identifies an inter-temporal change in the association between auditor independence and the cost of borrowing. It could be that other unidentified factors, unrelated to SOX, affect that inter-temporal relation. To address this concern we repeated our analysis using capture is simply the result of a secular trend over time, we would expect to replicate the previous findings using this arbitrary cutoff point. However, we find that the association between auditor independence and cost of borrowing is not different across these two periods.
Overall, these sensitivity tests provide additional evidence in support of the argument that the relationship between auditor independence and cost of borrowing has changed following the enactment of SOX.
Summary
We investigate whether the negative association between auditor independence and the cost of borrowing, measured here as bond rating and yield spread, has become stronger following the enactment of SOX. This is an important and relevant issue as SOX and related regulation have been criticized for high implementation costs with little or no benefits. We offer a theoretical model in which cost of capital is inversely related to auditor independence. The model predicts that if SOX has been successful at enhancing auditor independence, and if reporting quality is sufficiently sensitive to auditor independence, we would expect to find stronger association between auditor independence and cost of debt capital in the period following the enactment. Our empirical findings are consistent with this prediction and are robust to changes in model specification, variable measurement and estimation methods.
Nevertheless, our research design suffers from at least one caveat. It is possible that our findings are driven by a change in investors' and credit rating agencies' perceptions of the "value relevance" of auditor independence, rather the effect of SOX itself on auditor independence. That is, to the extent that bond investors and credit rating agencies did not fully appreciate the role of auditor independence as an effective mechanism prior to recent accounting scandals and the subsequent change in the regulatory landscape, they failed to take into account audit independence before the enactment of SOX. This may be what we capture, rather than the effectiveness of SOX per se.
Appendix -The Association between Auditor Independence and Cost of

Capital -A Theoretical Model (1) Preliminaries
Consider a single period competitive security market populated by risk-averse investors with negative exponential utility function of the form u(x) = -exp -ρx , where ρ is the risk aversion parameter and x is each investor's final wealth. Without loss of generality, assume each investor can buy one security and that the risk-free rate is zero. If the investor buys one security, then x will be a function of the payoff on the security, which is assumed to be a normal random variable, v, where v ∼ N (μ 0 , σ 2 ) and μ 0 > 0. If the price of the security is P, then the investor's end of period wealth is x = v -P. That is, the investor's final wealth is the profit on the investment. The expected utility under these assumptions is related to the expression:
In equilibrium, P is such that the expression in the square bracket is zero. If P is too large, the expression in (A1) is negative, implying no one will be willing to buy the security. If P is too small then expression (A1) is positive, however, investors in a competitive market will bid this price up. Therefore the equilibrium security price is given by
P is increasing in the expected cash flow on the security, μ 0 , and is decreasing in the variability of the final cash flow, σ 2 . The higher the risk of the security, the lower its price and the higher is the cost of capital. Therefore, a lower price is equivalent to higher cost of capital (captured here by the difference between P and μ 0 ). 
Integrating over all possible realizations of S, the expected equilibrium price is given by:
P, on average, is negatively related to the signal's variance, 2 ε σ , which means that less accurate financial reporting increases the investment risk. 
(5) The effect of auditor independence on the cost of capital
The cost of capital is lower when the auditor is more independent. To see that, rewrite Equation (A4) -the expected equilibrium price -as follows:
To see how E(P) changes with I, differentiate Equation (A5) with respect to I. Because the slope coefficient in the regression of the security price on auditor independence, β, is this derivative:
The positive relation is the consequence of two effects of the auditor independence: (i) the effect of improving the accuracy of the accounting report and thereby reducing the investment risk,
, and (ii) the effect of preventing fraud and waste through monitoring as 0
The former effect on the cost of capital is present when investors are risk-averse. On the other hand, the latter effect influences the price independently of the market's degree of risk aversion.
Since E(P) increases in I, it follows that the expected cost of capital is decreasing in auditor independence. However, note that β is not a constant with respect to I. Specifically,
The magnitude of the negative association between cost of capital and auditor independence is stronger (weaker) if Equation (A7) 
Here Kg(I) represents the revenue function whereby ( ) 0 g I ′ < -so higher independence causes a reduction in revenues -and K is the dollar revenue lost when independence is increased by one unit. Further assume that ( ) 0 g I ′′ < , implying that the loss to revenues is relatively small as I increases in the vicinity of I min -i.e., when the auditor is highly dependent on the client -and much larger in the vicinity f I max -i.e., when the auditor is highly independent. C represents a cost associated with weaker independence, and this cost is increasing faster with h, as is reflected in the condition that 1
The auditor's objective is to maximize expression (A8) by optimally choosing I. Thus, we need to solve the following expression:
The first and second order conditions are given by A10 and A11, respectively:
The sign of (A11) is negative, confirming it is a maximization problem with a unique solution.
8 Two important observations arise: First, a higher K will lead to lower auditor independence, because the auditor will optimally select a smaller I while earning higher fees. Second, a higher C leads to higher auditor independence.
(7) The effect of SOX on auditor independence and cost of capital
The objective of SOX was to cause auditors to become more diligent in the monitoring and reporting activities by imposing restrictions on NAS and the creation of the PCAOB, among other requirements. These requirements are essentially equivalent to increasing C, the cost associated with weaker independence. On the other hand, the rent K charged by auditors for giving up a unit of independence could increase following SOX. This is plausible because auditors now face a tougher litigation environment, so they may demand a higher rent following
SOX.
To find out the effect of SOX on I and, in turn, on β, consider a continuous variable L that represent the strictness of the legal environment. To the extent that SOX makes the legal environment stricter, it will work to increase L. Let / K L ∂ ∂ represent the effect of changing the legal environment on the auditor's revenues and let / C L ∂ ∂ denote the effect on cost. Therefore the effect on the equilibrium level of independence is given by
Note that the sign of (A12) is ambiguous because ∂I/∂K < 0 and ∂I/∂C > 0. We believe that the sign of (A12) on empirical grounds is likely positive. This is quite plausible, as the main focus of SOX was to create a framework that penalizes lack of independence. Furthermore, Table 3 indicates that total fees have declined after SOX, which in turn suggests auditors may not have been able to charge more for collusion with managers while keeping the same level of independence. Had SOX reduced auditor independence we would expect total fees to increase after its enactment. Now, the effect of SOX on β can be expressed as
Our main findings are consistent with a positive sign of (A13) as we find stronger negative association between auditor independence and cost of capital in the post-SOX period. Notes:
1. The Table presents annual results for estimating equations (1) with RAUD as the dependent variable in Panel A (using the Quasi-Likelihood method), and with LTFEE as the dependent variable in Panel B (using OLS). Regressions include industry fixed effects (not tabulated).
2. Dependent variables are defined as follows: RAUD is measured as audit fees paid by client i to audit firm j divided by total fees paid by client i to audit firm j. UNEXPRAUD denotes unexpected values of RAUD based on regression residuals obtained from annual regression models as described in Panel A. LTFEE is the natural logarithm of total fees (audit and nonaudit) received by the external auditor j from client i. UNEXPLTFEE denotes unexpected values of [(-1) x LTFEE], based on regression residuals obtained from annual regression models as described in Panel B. 3. Independent variables are defined as follows: ROA denotes return on assets, measured as net income before extraordinary items (Compustat item #18) divided by total assets (item #6). LOSS is an indicator variable that obtains the value of "1" if the firm reports negative net income (item #18), and "0"otherwise. MRET is market-adjusted annual stock return, measured as the difference between raw return for a specific firm minus the return on a value-weighted market portfolio obtained from CRSP. CFO denotes cash flows from operations (item #308) divided by total assets (item #6). LEV denotes leverage, measured as the ratio of long term debt (data #9) over total assets (data #6). INVREC denotes inventory (item #3) plus accounts receivable (item #2) divided by total assets (item #6). SIZE is measured as log (1 + total assets) = log (1+ Compustat data #6). MB denotes market-to-book ratio, measured as market value of equity (item #25 multiplied by item #199) divided by book value of equity (item #216). SALEG denotes sales growth, measured as average percentage change in sales over the last three years. MA is an indicator variable, taking the value of "1" if there is merger and acquisition activity in the current year, and "0" otherwise. SEG is the number of business segments. AUDDUM is an indicator variable, equal to "1" if the auditor belongs to Big-4, and "0" otherwise. TENU is the natural logarithm of (1+TENURE), where TENURE is the length of the auditor-client relationship, measured as the number of years the firm has been consistently audited by the current auditor, as of the bond filing date and based on Compustat. SWITCH is an indicator variable, equal to "1" if a bond-issuing firm switches to a different audit firm in the fiscal year prior to the bond issuance, and "0" otherwise. LIT is litigation risk, measured as the standard deviation of monthly return for the past 36 months.
4. *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. We report the coefficient estimate and two-tailed t-stats (below each coefficient). Table presents pair-wise correlations for selected variables. Pearson (Spearman) correlations are presented above (below) the diagonal. Correlations above 0.06 and below -0.06 are significant at the 0.05 level. The variables are: SPREAD is the difference in percentage points between the yield-to-maturity for the corporate bond and that of a U.S. treasury bond with comparable maturity; RATING is Moody's bond rating on a cardinal scale from 1 for Aaa to 22 for D; ISIZE is the size of the debt issue, measured as the ratio of total principal amount of the bond over firm's total assets; OSCORE is a measure of default risk based on the coefficients obtained by Ohlson (1980) ; UNEXPRAUD is unexpected values of the ratio of audit fees to total fees; UNEXPLTFEE denotes unexpected values of log of total fees; SIZE is measured as log (1+ Compustat data #6). LEV denotes leverage, measured as the ratio of long term debt (data #9) over total assets (data #6). ROA denotes return on assets, measured as net income before extraordinary items (Compustat item #18) divided by total assets (item #6). MRET is market-adjusted annual stock return, measured as the difference between raw return for a specific firm minus the return on a value-weighted market portfolio obtained from CRSP. CFO denotes cash flows from operations (item #308) divided by total assets (item #6). MB denotes market-to-book ratio, measured as market value of equity (item #25 multiplied by item #199) divided by book value of equity (item #216). LIT is litigation risk, measured as the standard deviation of monthly return for the past 36 months. 1. The Table presents results for estimating equations (2a) and (2b) using OLS with industry fixed effects (not tabulated). See Tables 1 and 3 for variable definitions. 2. The regression models are: 1. The Table presents results for estimating equations (2a) and (2b) using OLS with industry fixed effects (not tabulated). See Tables 1 and 3 for variable definitions. 2. The regression models are: 3. *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. We report coefficient estimates and t-statistics (below each coefficient). 1. The Table presents results for estimating equations (2a) and (2b) using OLS with industry fixed effects (not tabulated). See Tables 1 and 3 for variable definitions. 2. The regression models are: 3. *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. We report coefficient estimates and t-statistics (below each coefficient). 1. The Table presents results for estimating equations (2a) and (2b) using OLS with industry fixed effects. We report only the coefficients on the independence measures (UNEXPRAUD, UNEXPLTFEE, and RAUD).
2. See Table 6 for a description of the estimated models and Tables 1 and 3 for variable  definitions. 3. *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. We report a one-tailed p-value for the auditor independence variables (UNEXPRAUD, UNEXPLTFEE, and RAUD).
8 In a more general setting ( ) h I ′′ can be assumed to be negative and ( ) g I ′′ to be positive.
However, with these alternative assumptions, to ensure an interior solution the sign of the second order condition (A11) should be assumed negative. 9 These observations follow from the application of the Implicit Function Theorem to Equation (A10) noting that the sign of Equation (A11) is negative.
